Rob Hoskins
05-16-2011, 10:00 AM
In Bourgeois, et. al. v. Local 112 Insulators & Asbestos Workers, et. al., various funds and employers are fighting over all sorts of different things. In the attached order, the court is considering various parties’ motions for summary judgment and denies them all finding that there are fact issues. However, one employer makes a novel argument which is that in order for an employer to be bound to a CBA the employer has to actually sign the written agreement required by 28 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B). The District Court rejects that argument.
Of note, the Fifth Circuit has held that "adoption of a labor contract is not dependent on the reduction to writing of their intention to be bound. Instead what is required is conduct manifesting an intention to abide by the terms of the agreement." NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 355-56, n. 1 (5th Cir. 1981) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=68&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b641%20F.2d%20351%2c%20355%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=1149332fdf47b78547e5e252606f09cb) (using the term "labor contract" to refer to a collective bargaining agreement, although the court did not consider § 186(c) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=69&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=2e04b71700183d9b24f7252a94aa19cd)) (citations omitted). But, whether a party may express consent to a collective bargaining agreement through a course of conduct (i.e., whether a signature is required) and whether a course of conduct is sufficient to satisfy § 186(c)(2)(B) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=70&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=998bd68ed3c6e9c19916a82a6defc4ac)'s "written agreement" requirement are two distinct issues. At this point of the analysis, only the latter issue is relevant.
The Fifth Circuit has never directly held, as far as this Court has found, that conduct manifesting assent to a collective bargaining agreement is sufficient to satisfy § 186(c)(5)(B) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=71&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=792b1df3d980d95b8a8115893a83087a). However, the Seventh Circuit held in Bricklayer's Local 21 v. Banner Restoration, Inc., 385 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2004) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=72&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b385%20F.3d%20761%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=3929ffe1dc43e1adfb95f99a41f89aa2), that § 186 (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=73&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=cfb5fa63c6a4268aff6edd3973d1b838) imposes no statutory signature requirement. Instead, an employer's course of conduct that manifests consent to a written collective bargaining agreement is sufficient. Other Circuits are in accord. See, e.g., Brown, 194 F.3d at 355, n. 1 (2d Cir. 1999) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=74&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b194%20F.3d%20351%2c%20355%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=69313a4ab058cd8f4e43d82d4e757602) (holding that § 186(c)(5)(B) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=75&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=7b77eacb0f6c25535c2ec330b299e014) "does not require that an agreement be signed, only that it be 'written' and set forth 'a detailed basis on which . . . payments are to be made'" to a trust fund); Nat'l Leadburners Health & Welfare Fund v. O.G. Kelley & Co., 129 F.3d 372, 375, 376 (6th Cir. 1997) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=76&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b129%20F.3d%20372%2c%20375%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=8f5218ed3d72a5c13bc11d0fd807ff39) ("The statute does not specify any signature requirement and the term 'written agreement' is unambiguous in relation to such"); Trs. of Atlanta Iron Workers, Local 387 Pension Fund v. S. Stress Wire Corp., 724 F.2d 1458, 1459-60 (11th Cir. 1983) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=77&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b724%20F.2d%201458%2c%201459%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite% 3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=cd5fc90161cdf3a35840fc8bc722ce16).
Significantly, this Court is not aware of any circuit that has imposed a statutory signature requirement under § 186(c) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=87&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=65a95f9ef0629b8d80e45426b3b3fb30). Indeed, the plain language of § 186(c)(5)(B) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=88&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=ac8e5701a525dc94aee2d6eb37b3ff33) requires only a "written agreement" that sets forth "a detailed basis on which . . . payments are to be made" to a trust fund. By its literal language, no signature is required. See Nat'l Leadburners Health & Welfare Fund, 129 F.3d at 376 (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=89&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b129%20F.3d%20372%2c%20376%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=72c43a89a21162dbfe31e26cc2edb6b0) ("[T]he statue is satisfied by a written agreement to which an employer is bound, not a written agreement to which an employer is bound which also carries that employer's signature"). Absent precedent that dictates otherwise or an explicit statutory mandate, this Court will not read a signature requirement into the statute. Accordingly, §186(c)(5)(B) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=90&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=aaa7ba4376abbcb6e8a23b84281b9776) does not impose a signature requirement; instead, "conduct manifesting an intention to abide by the terms of the agreement" is sufficient to bind an employer to a written agreement. Haberman, 641 F.2d at 355-56 (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=91&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b641%20F.2d%20351%2c%20355%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=0e0b4df17f5e92e345a6e69e137694e9).
Nevertheless, if either the collective bargaining agreement or the trust agreements require a signature, then the Insulator's actions were proper in this case. Here, neither the collective bargaining agreement nor the trust agreements require an employer to sign the respective agreements to be bound. Accordingly, the lack of a signature on part of MSI is not determinative of whether § 186(c) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=95&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=90983f4a25dcc29e19277eee0c09b6c4)'s written agreement requirement has been satisfied; instead a course of conduct is sufficient to manifest assent to a collective bargaining agreement.
A copy of the decision is attached.
Of note, the Fifth Circuit has held that "adoption of a labor contract is not dependent on the reduction to writing of their intention to be bound. Instead what is required is conduct manifesting an intention to abide by the terms of the agreement." NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 355-56, n. 1 (5th Cir. 1981) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=68&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b641%20F.2d%20351%2c%20355%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=1149332fdf47b78547e5e252606f09cb) (using the term "labor contract" to refer to a collective bargaining agreement, although the court did not consider § 186(c) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=69&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=2e04b71700183d9b24f7252a94aa19cd)) (citations omitted). But, whether a party may express consent to a collective bargaining agreement through a course of conduct (i.e., whether a signature is required) and whether a course of conduct is sufficient to satisfy § 186(c)(2)(B) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=70&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=998bd68ed3c6e9c19916a82a6defc4ac)'s "written agreement" requirement are two distinct issues. At this point of the analysis, only the latter issue is relevant.
The Fifth Circuit has never directly held, as far as this Court has found, that conduct manifesting assent to a collective bargaining agreement is sufficient to satisfy § 186(c)(5)(B) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=71&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=792b1df3d980d95b8a8115893a83087a). However, the Seventh Circuit held in Bricklayer's Local 21 v. Banner Restoration, Inc., 385 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2004) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=72&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b385%20F.3d%20761%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=3929ffe1dc43e1adfb95f99a41f89aa2), that § 186 (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=73&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=cfb5fa63c6a4268aff6edd3973d1b838) imposes no statutory signature requirement. Instead, an employer's course of conduct that manifests consent to a written collective bargaining agreement is sufficient. Other Circuits are in accord. See, e.g., Brown, 194 F.3d at 355, n. 1 (2d Cir. 1999) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=74&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b194%20F.3d%20351%2c%20355%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=69313a4ab058cd8f4e43d82d4e757602) (holding that § 186(c)(5)(B) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=75&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=7b77eacb0f6c25535c2ec330b299e014) "does not require that an agreement be signed, only that it be 'written' and set forth 'a detailed basis on which . . . payments are to be made'" to a trust fund); Nat'l Leadburners Health & Welfare Fund v. O.G. Kelley & Co., 129 F.3d 372, 375, 376 (6th Cir. 1997) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=76&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b129%20F.3d%20372%2c%20375%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=8f5218ed3d72a5c13bc11d0fd807ff39) ("The statute does not specify any signature requirement and the term 'written agreement' is unambiguous in relation to such"); Trs. of Atlanta Iron Workers, Local 387 Pension Fund v. S. Stress Wire Corp., 724 F.2d 1458, 1459-60 (11th Cir. 1983) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=77&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b724%20F.2d%201458%2c%201459%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite% 3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=cd5fc90161cdf3a35840fc8bc722ce16).
Significantly, this Court is not aware of any circuit that has imposed a statutory signature requirement under § 186(c) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=87&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=65a95f9ef0629b8d80e45426b3b3fb30). Indeed, the plain language of § 186(c)(5)(B) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=88&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=ac8e5701a525dc94aee2d6eb37b3ff33) requires only a "written agreement" that sets forth "a detailed basis on which . . . payments are to be made" to a trust fund. By its literal language, no signature is required. See Nat'l Leadburners Health & Welfare Fund, 129 F.3d at 376 (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=89&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b129%20F.3d%20372%2c%20376%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=72c43a89a21162dbfe31e26cc2edb6b0) ("[T]he statue is satisfied by a written agreement to which an employer is bound, not a written agreement to which an employer is bound which also carries that employer's signature"). Absent precedent that dictates otherwise or an explicit statutory mandate, this Court will not read a signature requirement into the statute. Accordingly, §186(c)(5)(B) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=90&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=aaa7ba4376abbcb6e8a23b84281b9776) does not impose a signature requirement; instead, "conduct manifesting an intention to abide by the terms of the agreement" is sufficient to bind an employer to a written agreement. Haberman, 641 F.2d at 355-56 (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=91&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA %5b641%20F.2d%20351%2c%20355%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=0e0b4df17f5e92e345a6e69e137694e9).
Nevertheless, if either the collective bargaining agreement or the trust agreements require a signature, then the Insulator's actions were proper in this case. Here, neither the collective bargaining agreement nor the trust agreements require an employer to sign the respective agreements to be bound. Accordingly, the lack of a signature on part of MSI is not determinative of whether § 186(c) (https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=893bc0330d98dc2276f6cae6e9e85df6&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDAT A%5b2011%20U.S.%20Dist.%20LEXIS%2051083%5d%5d%3e%3 c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=95&_butInline=1&_butinfo=28%20U.S.C.%20186&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzb-zSkAA&_md5=90983f4a25dcc29e19277eee0c09b6c4)'s written agreement requirement has been satisfied; instead a course of conduct is sufficient to manifest assent to a collective bargaining agreement.
A copy of the decision is attached.